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 Is replication important for HCI?
 
 
Abstract 
Replication is emerging as a key concern within 
subsections of the HCI community. In this paper, we 
explore the relevance of science and technology studies 
(STS), which has addressed replication in various ways. 
Informed by this literature, we examine HCI’s current 
relationship to replication and provide a set of 
recommendations and points of clarification that a 
replication agenda in HCI should concern itself with. 
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Introduction 
Replication is emerging as a concern within subsections 
of the HCI community. A key motivation for this is a 
feeling that HCI emphasises novelty over consolidation 
of research; consolidation that can be achieved via 
replication. In response, we advocate the relevance to 
HCI of understandings of ‘replication’ emerging from 
the philosophy and sociology of science and technology. 
This paper highlights a collection of rejoinders to the 
ways in which this programme for replication is 
currently conceptualised within HCI. In doing so we 
intend to help the development of an endogenous 
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understanding of replication as a practice that can be a) 
motivated, b) mature and c) fit for the purposes of HCI.  
Replication: Lessons from STS 
We believe that debate on replication in HCI can be 
enriched by STS and philosophy and sociology of 
science. In this section we review some of the findings 
of this literature and their pertinence to HCI. 
One of the motivations for replication within HCI is the 
wish to make HCI more scientific by modelling HCI on 
other sciences (e.g., “psychology, physics and 
medicine” [11]). While there is nothing problematic in 
asking for a field to involve more replication, to frame 
this in terms of making it more ‘scientific’ is possibly 
based on a mythical view of ‘good science’ of which 
"[r]eplication of research is a cornerstone" [11]. This 
view suggests this ‘science’ may be a homogenous 
practice, possibly even based around a particular 
method, ‘the’ scientific method. It also tends to think 
about replication more from the perspective of the 
philosophy of science, rather than the practice of 
different sciences. 
In contrast, philosophical and sociological studies have 
shown that ‘science’ refers to a fragile structure of 
multiple disciplines and multiple methods linked by 
‘family resemblances’ only [9, 3]. Not all empirical 
sciences work with experiments, and the role of 
experiments may differ between different fields. 
Complicating this picture is the separation between these 
varied and autochthonous scientific practices and their 
rendering into literature. Scientific literature is written in 
such a way to as to promise replicability, emerging from 
Boyle’s attempts to create scientific records that were 
publicly accountable and would let ‘anyone’ replicate 
experimental practices [10]. However, the nature of 
instructions is such that they are always incomplete [4], 
thus scientific instructions must be ‘filled in’ by competent 
members of the target scientific community in order to 
enact them as replications. This is one of the reasons why 
Medawar characterised the scientific paper, somewhat 
misleadingly, as a ‘fraud’ [8]. 
STS reports an alternative view on the nature of 
replication in the natural sciences to the surface view of 
scientific replication where scientific articles (in 
particular: their ‘method sections’) provide an adequate 
instruction manual for replication work. Specifically it 
problematises the notion of a ‘decisive experiment’ or 
by extension a ‘decisive replication’. At the heart of this 
problem is what Collins calls the “experimenter’s 
regress” [1], that is, a circular relation between 
experimental findings and the instruments used to 
produce them. Reliable experimental findings 
themselves rely upon reliable instruments and vice 
versa. As a result, a key difficulty of replication and the 
experimenter’s regress is that, particularly for 
contested science, there is not necessarily any standard 
for what is to be considered a valid replication. This 
raises a principle problem, since it is not clear whether 
a ‘failed’ replication is due to a problem with the 
original experiment or the subsequent replication (“it is 
often hard to tell whether an inability to replicate a 
result is due to a group’s failings or a flaw in the 
original paper” [5, p. 345]). 
Further to this, when we consider the track record of 
replication in the natural sciences, STS literature argues 
that replication in the (natural) sciences employs 
replication for specific, highly motivated and reasoned 
  
ends. Thus we find a marked absence of large amounts 
of replication in the sciences unless we focus on particular 
issues [1, pp. 210-211]. For instance, Collins’ tracing of 
the construction of gravitational wave detectors during 
the 1970s reveals the relevance of replication as an 
activity for working through what was a contested, 
controversial domain [2]. In short, ‘doing replication’ is 
not always seen as a fundamental prerequisite for valid 
scientific practice, since a vast number of results go 
unreplicated: instead it emerges as the result of 
pragmatic action for specific contested cases. 
In summary, then, our cursory examination of STS and 
its related literature highlights that: a) there is no 
singular form of science or scientific method upon 
which to model; b) there is no ‘algorithmic’ method for 
replicating directly from scientific literature (indeed, 
this is not its purpose); c) ‘absolute’ security of results 
is problematic in light of the experimenter’s regress; 
and d) sciences often do not involve replication as a 
‘matter of course’, it being difficult and of little value 
unless motivated (typically via contestation of results). 
Replication within HCI 
This issue of replication has become a centre of 
discussion within HCI. In light of STS’s view on 
replication, we seek to ask what is at stake in this 
discussion. Why replicate? Or: What are the (different) 
aims and motivations for replication? 
Within HCI, it has been acknowledged that there is not 
just one kind of replication. For example, Wilson et al. 
distinguish between four forms: “direct replication” 
(“driven by the aspirations of strong science”), 
“conceptual replication” (replication via “alternative 
methods”), “replicate & extend” (building on prior 
studies incrementally) and “applied case studies” 
(replication through application of prior work) [11].  
Nuancing this view, we want to start with introducing 
two different kinds of distinction to help us to think 
about replication. 
The first distinction is between what we characterise as 
textbook replication and frontier replication. By 
‘textbook replication’ we refer to replications of well-
known studies that are conducted from HCI textbooks, 
typically as part of undergraduate or graduate 
education. For instance, these could be replications of 
well-known usability studies. We distinguish this from 
‘frontier replication’ by which we mean replications of 
‘ongoing’ or ‘recent’ studies. We see these forms as 
conceptually and practically incommensurate, as 
opposed to integral facets (e.g., see position in [11] on 
“Benefits of Replication”). Thus, while the primary aim 
and motivation of textbook replications is learning, the 
point of frontier replication is often a form of ‘checking’ 
(which may even be done during the review process). 
As such we argue that the activities at this ‘frontier’ 
becomes the main issue for replication rather than what 
is happening ‘in the textbook’. 
A second distinction has to do with what may be replic-
able and what is actually replic-ated, in which the aims 
for each are quite different. ‘Being replicated’ concerns 
the ‘factual’ question of whether a particular study has, 
actually, been replicated by other researchers or not. 
We say ‘factual’ since subsequent studies may or may 
not be seen as valid replications, as in Collins’ study of 
gravitational wave detectors [2]. We also note again 
that a lack of actual replications may be related to 
matters such as experiments being too costly, too time 
  
consuming or lacking in providing the experimenter any 
obvious credit. 
In contrast ‘being replicable’ is motivated by the ‘in 
principle’ possibility of some other researcher being 
able to replicate an empirical study. This is often cited 
as one of the differences between ‘quantitative’ and 
‘qualitative’ methods (very problematic descriptions 
themselves), where the former supposedly produce 
results that could be replicated (again, ‘in principle’), 
while the later are not. For instance, ethnographic 
research is often said to be too reliant on the 
‘subjective’ insights of the ethnographer, resulting in 
non-generic and non-replicable findings. 
What’s at stake in this distinction? We would argue that 
the issue of ‘being replicable’ concerns a foundational 
question, in particular, whether HCI is a science and its 
preferences for particular methods over others. These 
questions are not new: psychology—which has strongly 
informed HCI’s development—has repeatedly 
foregrounded replication as an explicit agenda, such as 
in response to perceived experimental biases (e.g., 
being too ‘WEIRD’ [6]), as well as intentional and 
unintentional misconduct [12]. In this sense, ‘being 
replicated’ is probably more common in psychology 
than many other sciences because of this explicit 
concern (now displayed in HCI) for the lack of actual 
replicated studies (or those ‘seen as’ validly replicated).  
Psychology’s own debates around its status as a 
science are also consonant with these foundational 
concerns of ‘being replicable’, and in the replication 
agenda we see HCI grasping towards key 
epistemological themes which arise in the natural 
sciences: alongside ‘observation’, ‘measurement’, 
‘description’ and ‘reasoning’ is, of course, ‘replication’. 
If we take HCI as a scientific endeavour (e.g., [11]) 
then it follows that its concern for replication would 
thus be informed by this particular picture of ‘normal 
science’; or ‘doing what scientists do’. However, this 
assumes coherence of ‘science’ as monolithic practice 
as well as mythologising that practice. 
In contrast, ‘being replicated’ is a more pragmatic 
question, which concerns what we can learn from 
replications and, for example, whether it would be 
worthwhile to publish more papers based on replication.  
In order to focus the discussion of replication in HCI, it 
would be very helpful if one could gather more 
examples from different disciplines, from biology to 
physics, to see whether and how replications are valued 
in these. Thus we hazard a conjecture: that replication 
enjoys a special status within psychology (and the 
debate of replication in HCI is thus a reflection of the 
influence of psychology, rather than, say, biology, in 
HCI). But why might that be? 
One issue is with the scale of the question to be 
answered through experiment. Some sciences tackle 
very detailed and small questions through extremely 
detailed experiments. In other words, there exist a very 
tight relationship between the data gathered through 
the experiments and the derived conclusions. Other 
sciences (e.g., social science) tackle bigger questions 
and consequently involve a looser relation between 
data and conclusion.   
We would argue that there is a ‘scale’ tension in 
psychology—and thus HCI—between tackling ‘big’ and 
‘minute’ questions, questions that can, or can’t be 
  
settled through experiments. One possible reason for 
more replication in psychology is that studies can be 
questioned more (i.e., findings are more open to 
interpretation). 
Discussion 
We have raised some broad issues in the relationship 
between replication and HCI, and informed this debate 
through recourse to existing work in STS that has 
explored replication in the natural sciences.  
Firstly we argue for the importance of the increased 
consultation of literatures normally foreign to HCI such 
as that of STS. This is particularly the case for 
situations where knowledge within the field is out of 
step with more recent advances in understandings of 
scientific knowledge. For instance, our discussions on 
replication (and science) within HCI are largely 
Popperian or pre-Popperian in form, such as appeals to 
ideals such as falsificationism. While we would not 
argue against such ideals, we contend that 
understanding benefits from expansion, thus as well as 
citing Collins, we might also refer to developments by 
Kuhn, Feyerabend or Lynch that, for instance, 
encapsulate empirical investigations into practical 
mundane scientific action [7].  
A fundamental question for the desire for replication in 
HCI is that of the motivation to perform replication in 
the first place. We need to ask ourselves why we might 
bother with replication in the first place and whether 
there is any value gained from pursuing a replication 
agenda as a distinctive activity within HCI (which is the 
position of the workshop call [11]). As we have seen 
from STS literature, if we feel the need to derive HCI’s 
programme from the methods and epistemological 
topics of the natural sciences (e.g., via psychology), 
then we must do so knowingly in light of findings from 
STS. Thus we argue for different understandings of 
replication: a) as an unstable and negotiated practice; 
b) as a highly motivated activity rather than as an end 
of itself; and c) as playing an important role in the 
resolution of scientific controversies. Moving forwards 
we would draw attention to the judicious motivated 
application of replication—and the need for ‘just why’ 
and ‘just how’ it is to be pursued. So, we must be clear 
about the purposes and motivations of any given 
replication beyond abstractly “validating and 
understanding contributions” [11]. 
Finally, we have argued that a mythological view of 
science tends to be implicit in HCI regarding its status 
as scientific. This leads us to question the value in 
positioning HCI as a scientific endeavour. Thus we 
recommend that it would be helpful to separate the 
‘foundational’ question (whether HCI is a science) from 
the above ‘pragmatic’ question (about the specific 
benefits of replication for HCI).  
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